Thursday, May 10, 2018

As a seafaring state, America demands maximal access to the world’s oceans within the constraints of international law. Though seldom recognized, U.S. efforts to defend its interest in maritime freedom in the Western Pacific have been fairly successful. When the People’s Republic of China unlawfully draws “fences” around the sea, U.S. warships steam through the fences. Beijing recognizes the seriousness of America’s position, and thus far has generally yielded.

However, when it comes to helping its allies and partners protect themselves against Chinese encroachment, the United States has a mixed record. Since 2006, Beijing has dramatically expanded the frontiers of its control in the East and South China Seas. To pursue its irredentist agenda, Beijing has largely relied on unarmed or lightly armed paranaval forces — coast guard and militia — conducting operations in what has been described as the “gray zone” between war and peace. Despite the robust presence of American sea power in contested areas of maritime East Asia, the United States has largely failed to halt China’s bullying behavior. This failure devalues Washington’s commitments to its friends and shakes the foundations of the U.S. alliance system — the true source of American global influence.

To better aid its allies and partners, Washington should consider expanding its catalogue of peacetime maritime operations. Passive presence has proved inadequate. In some cases, American policymakers may need to place U.S. forces on the front lines, where they can play a more direct role helping other states counter China’s seaward expansion.

Defending U.S. Maritime Freedom: Largely a Success Story

The United States does not possess or claim any land west of the Mariana Islands and therefore has no proprietary interest in the outcome of sovereignty disputes in the East and South China seas. However, Beijing’s maritime claims do directly threaten U.S. maritime freedom: above all, the freedom to conduct naval operations unimpeded wherever international law allows. China seeks to turn the exclusive economic zone into a security zone. It proclaims the prerogative to limit foreign naval activities within its jurisdictional waters, imperiling American access to huge sections of ocean within the First Island Chain. China’s method for drawing baselines around terrestrial features — the first step in demarcating zones of maritime jurisdiction — also threatens U.S. interests. By treating islands, rocks, and reefs as clusters instead of individual features, Beijing creates far more “Chinese” space than it is legally entitled. This “fake it till you make it” approach to international law risks generating gigantic sea and air zones in which Beijing claims the sovereign right to exclude all foreign activities it opposes.

The United States justifiably refuses to allow China’s excessive claims to affect its behavior. U.S. Navy special mission ships, for instance, routinely operate in the East Asian littorals. Ocean surveillance vessels like the Impeccable and Victorious monitor the underwater environment with their powerful towed arrays, collecting intelligence on foreign submarine activities. Meanwhile, oceanographic survey ships like the Bowditch and the Henson compile foundational marine data that serve as inputs for the systems and models upon which the fleet relies. With these operations, American forces exercise navigational freedoms to serve U.S. security interests in this region.

The U.S. Navy also engages in targeted acts of defiance, operations conducted for the sole purpose of resisting China’s excessive claims. Where China’s claims are explicit, the Navy sends ships and aircraft to conduct freedom of navigation operations. In the Paracels, for example, U.S. Navy ships have performed “maneuvering operations” to challenge China’s claim to sovereignty over waters that should be open to other states. The U.S. Navy has even conducted freedom of navigation operation-like activities to defy claims that China has not yet made, preemptively staking out the American position before China erects its next fence. China has built an enormous base at Mischief Reef, a feature not entitled to a territorial sea. By sending ships there now — even to conduct an operation as innocuous as a “man overboard” drill— the U.S. Navy shows China that even a large base cannot generate maritime sovereignty.

With these operations, Washington employs what James Cable called the “definitive” use of sea power. It asserts its maritime freedom — indeed, the maritime freedom entitled to all seafaring states — regardless of China’s claims, thereby placing Beijing in a passive position. China can respond with violence or it can acquiesce.

Faced with this stark choice, Beijing has pioneered a third option: Chinese coast guard and militia forces track U.S. ships, insist that they leave, and even sometimes physically impede their navigation — the last of which is in flagrant violation of international law. In December 2016, a People’s Liberation Army-Navy ship even seized a U.S. underwater glider in international waters 50 nautical miles northwest of Subic Bay. Still, these incidents remain rare and have utterly failed to dampen American resolve to sail, fly, and operate wherever international law allows.

Nevertheless, this is no cause for complacency. As the 2017 National Security Strategy emphasizes, China is engaged in “continuous competition” with America — neither fully “at peace” nor fully “at war.” Beijing has not renounced its excessive claims. Indeed, if it takes further steps to “jurisdictionalize” the South China Sea — such as drawing straight baselines in the Spratlys — the potential for friction at sea could increase dramatically. Ensuring freedom of the seas requires the United States take further steps, such as publicly exposing the reckless behavior of Chinese para-naval forces at sea and updating rules of engagement.

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MAY 10, 2018

Photo from Pixabay

Andrew Erickson picture

Ryan D. Martinson is an assistant professor in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He has just published the institute’s latest monograph, entitled Echelon Defense: The Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute StrategyAndrew S. Erickson is a professor of strategy in the China Maritime Studies Institute, an associate in research at Harvard’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, and a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations.