There was an elephant in the room at the recently concluded Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Manila as well as at the East Asia Summit (EAS) and other ASEAN-based meetings in Kuala Lumpur last month: the quiet, potential sway of China-centered initiatives and arrangements on the future of Asian architecture, amid the increasing great power rivalry in the South China Sea. APEC and EAS, of course, are not led by China.
Abstract: If “militarisation” is defined as an act of deploying military assets to pursue wider strategic ends, then all players of the South China Sea disputes have engaged in some forms of militarisation. China’s militarisation reflect three layers of target audiences: the United States (the main target), regional countries (the secondary target) and its domestic audience. Beijing’s growing anxieties over US rebalancing and the arbitration ruling have paradoxically pushed it to accelerate its “militarisation” activities.
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak madehigh-profile visits to China from October 18-21 and from October 31 to November 5,2016, respectively. It was the first China visit for Duterte since he took office about four months earlier (his first trip outside of ASEAN), and the third for Najib as premier since 2009. Both visits sparked concerns that have grown after Donald Trump's sur-prise triumph on November 8. Is the United States losing to China in the long-term geopolitical competition in Southeast Asia?
China, traditionally reluctant to intervene, has become a major contributor to UN peacekeeping operations. However, given its available assets, the country has the capacity to increase its commitments and play a key role in improving peacekeeping operations. This brief examines China’s rise as a global security provider and what can be done to drive its further engagement in the peacekeeping landscape.
IS CHINA PULLING ITS WEIGHT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM? In recent years, China has increased its contribution to United Nations peacekeeping, raised its foreign aid to impoverished countries, and made significant commitments to global arms control initiatives.1 Even so, a rising chorus of voices has charged that China is “free riding” on cooperation undertaken by the United States and other countries that provides benefits to the wider international community.
Manjari Chatterjee Miller is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University and the author of Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China.
Scott L. Kastner is Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park.
See pictures and videos of the 6th Annual JRCPPF Conference entitled 'Escalating Risks: China's Economy, Society and Financial System' that was co-sponsored by The China and the World Program (CWP).
State owned enterprises (SOEs) in China have undergone significant restructuring since the mid-1990s. To date, scholars have devoted considerable attention to the constraints and motives of corporate restructuring in China. Yet the majority of the existing studies treat restructuring as a simple ownership transfer from the state to non-state entities without differentiating the resulting ownership structure of the firm. Consequently, we know relatively little about why otherwise similar SOEs were restructured at different times and through different means.