FOR MORE THAN SEVEN DECADES, leadership in technological innovation has sustained the unique position of the United States in the international system. From nuclear energy to the Internet, U.S. preeminence in pioneering new technologies has been an important source of the country’s economic affluence and military might. In this context, it is not surprising that scholars now debate how rapidly emerging powers—particularly China and India —are de velopin g their own capacities for innovation. Thus far, this debate has reached no consensus.
Previous studies have found that the democratizing effect of conditional aid is temporally contingent: the collapse of the Soviet Union as an alternative source of aid enhanced the effectiveness of Western aid conditionality with respect to democratic reforms being adopted in Africa. Does conditionality still work with China’s rise as a major donor since the early 2000s? This article examines this question by leveraging the first Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) as the temporal dividing point and new measures of Chinese aid to Africa, based on expert opinions and media reports.
Is China's military ready to fight Asia's next major war? Over the past decade, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has made tremendous progress in modernizing its weapons and platforms, with notable advances ranging from precision-guided missiles to surface ships to cyber and space capabilities. However, progress has eluded the PLA in another area: becoming a modern joint force.
In recent years, scholarship examining US and security allies’ responses to China's rapidly growing power and “assertive” policies towards its neighbours has proliferated. The English-language literature remains relatively one-sided, however. Crucial to understanding the complex forces driving strategic competition in the contemporary Asia-Pacific are comprehensive surveys of how Chinese views are evolving.
One of the key themes of Xi Jinping’s attempts to reform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the need to recentralize power under the Central Military Commission (CMC), the PLA’s highest-level decision-making organ which Xi has led since November 2012. The thinking is that PLA modernization previously stalled (and corruption flourished) because too much authority had been ceded to the four general departments, seven military regions, and other power centers in the PLA that were more interested in protecting their own “vested interests” than in reform.
Chinese analysts have become less concerned about the prospects of an “Asian NATO” and more tolerant of regional multilateral-security activities.
North Korea’s recent ballistic missile launch—the first to occur during the Trump administration—once again raises the question of how the United States should handle the North Korean nuclear program, and how China should fit into the equation.
Jessica Chen Weiss is Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University. She is the author of Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations (Oxford University Press, 2014). The dissertation on which it is based won the 2009 American Political Science Association Award for best dissertation in international relations, law and politics.
Introduction - China’s economic development is entering a phase in which its old growth model is reaching its limit. The Chinese government has embarked on an effort to reorient the economy from an investment- and export-driven model toward one predicated on a larger role for consumption and market forces. At the same time that Chinese policymakers are attempting this structural reorientation, China is also experiencing what many observers consider to be a new normal of much slower economic growth.
Issued yesterday, the Pentagon’s annual report to Congress on China’s military and security developments contains a typically vast array of data, some publicly specified or confirmed for the first time.