In an official announcement by the Dean of the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University today, CWP Alumni Fellow Manjari C. Miller received tenure. Dean Adil Najam said, "Please join me in congratulating our colleague Manjari Miller for her very well-deserved promotion to Associate Professor with Tenure. We wish her a career full of accolades and a life of achievement and purpose.... and, of course, a long and distinguished career carrying the Pardee flag high and proud!"
Seoul needs to formulate a concrete strategy on its troublesome neighbor or risk being permanently sidelined. As the world held its breath watching the Asia-Pacific these past few weeks, parsing statements from Pyongyang, Washington, and Beijing, one voice was conspicuously missing from the fray — Seoul’s. One might be tempted to think that will now change.
Executive Summary China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has embarked on its most wide-ranging and ambitious restructuring since 1949, including major changes to most of its key organizations. ■ The general departments were disbanded, new Central Military Commission (CMC) departments created, and a new ground force headquarters established. ■ Seven military regions were restructured into five theater commands aligned against regional threats. Commanders will be able to develop joint force packages from army, navy, air force, and conventional missile units within their theaters.
Abstract: Identities have been viewed as determining Taiwan’s China policy, but this article argues that identities cannot explain Taipei’s China policy without reference to rationality. The article develops a theoretical framework that synthesises identities and rationality and examines Taipei’s cross-Strait exchange programs. We argue that whether Taipei imposes or relaxes bans on cross-Strait exchanges depends not only on its identities but also on its rational decisions in response to the status of cross-Strait relations.
Abstract: Post-Cold War, balancing theory has fallen on “hard times.” A question of crucial importance for 21st-century peace and stability concerns how Asia–Pacific secondary states are responding militarily to China's rise. China's rapid growth, military modernization, and controversial policies vis-à-vis contested space and territories on its periphery make it a prime candidate for counterbalancing behavior. Yet several recent studies claim that secondary states are accommodating, even bandwagoning with, Beijing.
Abstract: Since 2012, China’s assertion of its sovereignty claim to the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has significantly raised the risk of a potentially escalatory political-military crisis with Japan. As circumstances worsen, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has championed major institutional reforms aimed at centralizing Japanese security policy decision-making and vastly improving crisis management.
There was an elephant in the room at the recently concluded Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Manila as well as at the East Asia Summit (EAS) and other ASEAN-based meetings in Kuala Lumpur last month: the quiet, potential sway of China-centered initiatives and arrangements on the future of Asian architecture, amid the increasing great power rivalry in the South China Sea. APEC and EAS, of course, are not led by China.
Abstract: If “militarisation” is defined as an act of deploying military assets to pursue wider strategic ends, then all players of the South China Sea disputes have engaged in some forms of militarisation. China’s militarisation reflect three layers of target audiences: the United States (the main target), regional countries (the secondary target) and its domestic audience. Beijing’s growing anxieties over US rebalancing and the arbitration ruling have paradoxically pushed it to accelerate its “militarisation” activities.
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak madehigh-profile visits to China from October 18-21 and from October 31 to November 5,2016, respectively. It was the first China visit for Duterte since he took office about four months earlier (his first trip outside of ASEAN), and the third for Najib as premier since 2009. Both visits sparked concerns that have grown after Donald Trump's sur-prise triumph on November 8. Is the United States losing to China in the long-term geopolitical competition in Southeast Asia?