Sino-Japanese relations have been in another volatility cycle since the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes flared up again in summer 2012. The downward trend seems to have bottomed out in November 2014 when the two leaders Xi Jinping and Abe Shinzo finally held their first meeting since entering office. However, the anticipated recovery has proved tenuous; the momentum toward further improvement has halted since early 2016 when confrontation escalated in both the South China Sea and East China Sea.
Over the last two decades, China has experienced one of the most dramatic and sustained periods of economic growth in world history. China's use of economic statecraft provides an important venue in which to examine the role of unacknowledged ‘coercive diplomacy’ within the context of China's ‘peaceful rise discourse.’ In contrast to Western countries, which have overtly used sanctions and other forms of economic coercion, China has publicly denied any such policies while at the same time quietly pursuing them.
China’s economy and its military capabilities have grown significantly in the last three decades, yet Southeast Asian countries responded differently to China’s foreign policy. This article examines China’s assurance and reassurance strategy toward Malaysia and the Philippines in the South China Sea territorial disputes. It points outs the ‘assurance and entrapment’ strategy that China and its neighbors deployed toward each other. China deploys different foreign discourses toward these two countries to address their concerns, and these countries also positively respond to Chinese rhetoric.
South Korea, the U.S. and Beijing need to put their own fears aside and deliver Pyongyang a real ultimatum.
This article analyzes Japan’s landmark cabinet decision reinterpreting the constitution to allow the limited exercise of collective self-defense (CSD) in both a historical and a contemporary context and assesses its implications for the conditions under which Japan may use military force.
Mirroring the political impasse are the rancorous media reports coming from both sides. Frequent instances of mud-slinging and chest-thumping in the respective media confirm that the media suffers from the post imperial ideology (PII) syndrome.
Manjari Chatterjee Miller, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University, co-authored a recent journal article on India-Israel bilateral relations and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Israel.
Since 2012, China’s assertion of its sovereignty claim to the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has significantly raised the risk of a potentially escalatory political-military crisis with Japan. As circumstances worsen, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has championed major institutional reforms aimed at centralizing Japanese security policy decision-making and vastly improving crisis management.
When Narendra Modi visited Israel last week, he became the first Indian prime minister to set foot on Israeli soil. Modi’s visit and the ecstatic reception he received in Israel reflected a little-discussed fact: the relationship between India and Israel is among the world’s most unusual major-country partnerships.
FOR MORE THAN SEVEN DECADES, leadership in technological innovation has sustained the unique position of the United States in the international system. From nuclear energy to the Internet, U.S. preeminence in pioneering new technologies has been an important source of the country’s economic affluence and military might. In this context, it is not surprising that scholars now debate how rapidly emerging powers—particularly China and India —are de velopin g their own capacities for innovation. Thus far, this debate has reached no consensus.